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Abstract
Today, claims for social justice seem to divide into two types: claims for the
redistribution of resources and claims for the recognition of cultural difference.
Increasingly, these two kind of claims are polarized against one another. As a result,
we are asked to choose between class politics and identity politics, social
democracy and multiculturalism, redistribution and recognition. These, however, are
false antitheses. Justice today requires both redistribution and recognition. Neither
alone is sufficient.
As soon as one embraces this thesis, however, the question of how to combine
them becomes paramount. I contend that the emancipatory aspects of the two
paradigms need to be integrated in a single, comprehensive framework. In this
lecture, I consider two dimensions of this project. First, on the plane of moral
philosophy, I propose an overarching conception of justice that can accomodate both
defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition of
difference. Second, on the plane of social theory, I propose an approach that can
accomodate the complex relations between interest and identity, economy and
culture, class and status in contemporary globalizing capitalist society.
Zusammenfassung
In der aktuellen Debatte erscheinen Forderungen nach sozialer Gerechtigkeit in
zwei Typen aufgespalten: Forderungen nach Umverteilung von Ressourcen und
Forderungen nach Anerkennung kultureller Verschiedenheit. Diese beiden Typen
von Forderungen werden zunehmend gegeneinander polarisiert. Entsprechend
sollen wir wählen zwischen Klassenpolitik und Identitätspolitik, sozialer Demokratie
und Multikulturalismus, Umverteilung und Anerkennung. Es handelt sich dabei
jedoch um falsche Gegensätze. Gerechtigkeit erfordert heute beides: Umverteilung
und Anerkennung. Eines allein ist unzureichend.
Wenn man diese These akzeptiert, wird die Frage zentral, wie beide
Forderungen zu vereinbaren sind. Ich vertrete den Standpunkt, daß die
emanzipatorischen Aspekte der beiden Paradigmata in einem umfassenden Rahmen
integriert werden müssen. In diesem Beitrag werden zwei Dimensionen dieses
Vorhabens behandelt. Als erstes schlage ich auf der Ebene der Moralphilosophie
eine übergreifende Konzeption von Gerechtigkeit vor, die sowohl vertretbare
Forderungen nach sozialer Gleichheit umfaßt als auch vertretbare Forderungen
nach Anerkennung von Differenz. Als zweites schlage ich auf der Ebene von
Gesellschaftstheorie einen Ansatz vor, der den komplexen Beziehungen zwischen
Interesse und Identität, Ökonomie und Kultur sowie Klasse und Status in der
heutigen globalisierten, kapitalistischen Gesellschaft Rechnung trägt.

1In today's world, claims for social justice seem increasingly to divide into two types.
First, and most familiar, are redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution
of resources and goods. To be sure, the recent resurgence of free-market thinking
has put proponents of redistribution on the defensive. Nevertheless, egalitarian
redistributive claims have supplied the paradigm case for most theorizing about
social justice for the past 150 years.1
Today, however, we increasingly encounter a second type of social-justice claim
in the "politics of recognition." Here the goal, in its most plausible form, is a
difference-friendly world, where assimilation to majority or dominant cultural norms is
no longer the price of equal respect. This type of claim has recently attracted the
interest of political philosophers, moreover, some of whom are seeking to develop a
new paradigm of justice that puts recognition at its center.2
In general, then, we are confronted with a new constellation. The discourse of
social justice, once centered on distribution, is now increasingly divided between
claims for redistribution, on the one hand, and claims for recognition, on the other. In
this new constellation, the two kinds of justice claims are often dissociated from one
another. The result is a widespread decoupling of the cultural politics of difference
from the social politics of equality. In some cases, moreover, this dissociation has
become a polarization. Some proponents of redistribution reject the politics of
recognition outright, casting claims for the recognition of difference as "false
consciousness," a hindrance to the pursuit of social justice. Conversely, some
proponents of recognition see distributive politics as part and parcel of an outmoded
materialism, simultaneously blind to and complicit with many injustices. In such
cases, we are effectively presented with what is constructed as an either/or choice:
redistribution or recognition? class politics or identity politics? multiculturalism or
social democracy?
These, I have argued elsewhere, are false antitheses. Justice today requires
both redistribution and recognition. Neither alone is sufficient. As soon as one
embraces this thesis, however, the question of how to combine them becomes
paramount. I contend that the emancipatory aspects of the two paradigms need to be
integrated in a single, comprehensive framework. In moral philosophy, the task is to
devise an overarching conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible
claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference. In
social theory, the task is to understand the complex relations between class and
status, economy and culture, in social contexts that are increasingly postindustrial,
transnational, and multicultural. In political theory, the task is to envision a set of
institutional arrangements and associated policy reforms that can remedy both
maldistribution and misrecognition, while minimizing the mutual interferences likely
to arise when the two sorts of redress are sought simultaneously. In practical
politics, finally, the task is to foster democratic engagement across current divides in
2order to build a broad-based programmatic orientation that integrates the best of the
politics of redistribution with the best of the politics of recognition.
In this lecture, I limit myself to some of the moral-philosophical and social-
theoretical dimensions of this project. First, however, I want to summarize my
understanding of gender, it will figure prominently as an example throughout my
argument. In my conception, gender is a two-sided category. It encompasses both
an-economic dimension and a cultural dimension. Understanding and redressing
gender injustice requires changing attending to both distribution and recognition.
From the distributive perspective, gender is a basic organizing principle of the
economic structure of society. On the one hand, it structures the fundamental
division between paid "productive" labor and unpaid "reproductive" and domestic
labor, assigning women primary responsibility for the latter. On the other hand,
gender also structures the division within paid labor between higher-paid, male-
dominated, manufacturing and professional occupations and lower-paid, female-
dominated "pink collar" and domestic service occupations. The result is an economic
structure that generates gender-specific forms of distributive injustice.
From the recognition perspective, in contrast, gender is a status differentiation.
A major feature of gender injustice is androcentrism: the authoritative construction of
norms that privilege traits associated with masculinity and the pervasive devaluation
and disparagement of things coded as "feminine," paradigmatically -- but not only --
women. When these androcentric norms are institutionalized, women suffer gender-
specific status injuries, including sexual assault and domestic violence; objectifying
and demeaning stereotypical depictions in the media; harassment and
disparagement in everyday life; and exclusion or marginalization in public spheres
and deliberative bodies. These harms are injustices of misrecognition. They are
relatively independent of political economy and are not merely "superstructural."
Thus, they cannot be remedied by redistribution alone but require additional
independent remedies of recognition.
Gender, in sum, is a two-sided category. It contains both an economic face that
brings it within the ambit of redistribution and also a cultural face that brings it
simultaneously within the ambit of recognition. It is an open question whether the two
faces are of equal weight. But redressing gender injustice, in any case, requires
changing both the economic structure and the status order of contemporary society.
Gender, moreover, is not unusual in this regard. Many other key axes of
injustice are also two-sided in this way. But for present purposes I will let this
analysis of gender stand as a paradigm case for my general argument that justice
today requires both redistribution and recognition.
Let me turn therefore to some moral-theoretical questions that arise once we
contemplate trying to integrate redistribution and recognition in a single,
3comprehensive account of justice. Three such questions are especially important.
First, is recognition really a matter of justice, or is it a matter of self-realization?
Second, do distributive justice and recognition constitute two distinct, sui generis,
normative paradigms, or can either of them be subsumed within the other? And third,
does justice require the recognition of what is distinctive about individuals or groups,
or is recognition of our common humanity sufficient?
On the first question, two major theorists, Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth,
understand recognition as a matter of self-realization. Unlike them, however, I
consider it an issue of justice. Thus, one should not answer the question “what’s
wrong with misrecognition?” by saying that it constitutes an impediment to the self-
realization of the oppressed. One should say, rather, that it is unjust that some
individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners in social interaction
simply as a consequence of institutionalized patterns of cultural value in whose
construction they have not equally participated and which disparage their distinctive
characteristics or the distinctive characteristics assigned to them.
This account offers several advantages. First, it permits one to justify claims for
recognition as morally binding under modern conditions of value pluralism.3 Under
these conditions, there is no single conception of self-realization that is universally
shared, nor any that can be established as authoritative. Thus, any attempt to justify
claims for recognition that appeals to an account of self-realization must necessarily
be sectarian. Unlike such approaches, I assume that it is up to men and women to
define for themselves what counts as a good life and to devise for themselves an
approach to pursuing it, within limits that ensure a like liberty for others. What makes
misrecognition morally wrong, on my view, is that it denies some individuals and
groups the possibility of participating on a par with others in social interaction. The
norm of participatory parity is nonsectarian in the required sense. It appeals to a
conception if justice that can be accepted by people with divergent views of the good
life, provided that they agree to abide by fair terms of interaction under conditions of
value pluralism.
Treating recognition as a matter of justice has a second advantage as well. It
conceives misrecognition as a status injury whose locus is social relations, not
individual psychology. To be misrecognized, on this view, is not simply to be thought
ill of, looked down on, or devalued in others' conscious attitudes or mental beliefs. It
is rather to be denied the status of a full partner in social interaction and prevented
from participating as a peer in social life as a consequence of institutionalized
patterns of cultural value that constitute one as comparatively unworthy of respect or
esteem. This approach avoids difficulties that arise when misrecognition is
understood psychologically. When misrecognition is identified with internal
distortions in the structure of self-consciousness of the oppressed, it is but a short
step to blaming the victim. Conversely, when misrecognition is equated with
prejudice in the minds of the oppressors, overcoming it seems to require policing
their beliefs, an approach that is authoritarian. On the justice view, in contrast,
4misrecognition is a matter of externally manifest and publicly verifiable impediments
to some people's standing as full members of society. And such arrangements are
morally indefensible whether or not they distort the subjectivity of the oppressed.
Finally, the justice account of recognition avoids the view that everyone has an
equal right to social esteem. That view is patently untenable, because it renders
meaningless the notion of esteem. The account of recognition proposed here, in
contrast, entails no such reductio ad absurdum. What it does entail is that everyone
has an equal right to pursue social esteem under fair conditions of equal opportunity.
And such conditions do not obtain when, for example, institutionalized patterns of
interpretation pervasively downgrade femininity, “non-whiteness,” homosexuality,
and everything culturally associated with them. For all these reasons, recognition is
better viewed as a matter of justice than as a matter of self-realization. But what
follows for the theory of justice?
Does it follow, turning now to the second question, that distribution and
recognition constitute two distinct, sui generis conceptions of justice? Or can either
of them be reduced to the other? The question of reduction must be considered from
two different sides. From one side, the issue is whether standard theories of
distributive justice can adequately subsume problems of recognition. In my view, the
answer is no. To be sure, many distributive theorists appreciate the importance of
status over and above the allocation of resources and seek to accommodate it in
their accounts.4 But the results are not wholly satisfactory. Most such theorists
assume a reductive economistic-cum-legalistic view of status, supposing that a just
distribution of resources and rights is sufficient to preclude misrecognition. In fact,
however, not all misrecognition is a byproduct of maldistribution, nor of
maldistribution plus legal discrimination. Witness the case of the African-American
Wall Street banker who cannot get a taxi to pick him up. To handle such cases, a
theory of justice must reach beyond the distribution of rights and goods to examine
patterns of cultural value. It must consider whether institutionalized patterns of
interpretation and valuation impede parity of participation in social life.5
What, then, of the other side of the question? Can existing theories of
recognition adequately subsume problems of distribution? Here, too, I contend the
answer is no. To be sure, some theorists of recognition appreciate the importance of
economic equality and seek to accommodate it in their accounts.6 But once again the
results are not wholly satisfactory. Such theorists tend to assume a reductive
culturalist view of distribution. Supposing that economic inequalities are rooted in a
cultural order that privileges some kinds of labor over others, they assume that
changing that cultural order is sufficient to preclude maldistribution.7 In fact,
however, not all maldistribution is a byproduct of misrecognition. Witness the case of
the skilled white male industrial worker who becomes unemployed due to a factory
closing resulting from a speculative corporate merger. In that case, the injustice of
maldistribution has little to do with misrecognition. It is rather a consequence of
imperatives intrinsic to an order of specialized economic relations whose raison
5d’être is the accumulation of profits. To handle such cases, a theory of justice must
reach beyond cultural value patterns to examine the economic structure. It must
consider whether economic mechanisms that are relatively decoupled from cultural
value patterns and that operate in a relatively impersonal way can impede parity of
participation in social life.
In general then, neither distribution theorists nor recognition theorists have so
far succeeded in adequately subsuming the concerns of the other.8 Thus, instead of
endorsing either one of their paradigms to the exclusion of the other, I propose to
develop what I shall call a “bivalent” conception of justice. A bivalent conception
treats distribution and recognition as distinct perspectives on, and dimensions of,
justice.  Without reducing either one of them to the other, it encompasses both
dimensions within a broader, overarching framework.
The normative core of my conception, which I have mentioned several times, is
the notion of parity of participation.9 According to this norm, justice requires social
arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to interact with one another
as peers. For participatory parity to be possible, I claim, at least two conditions must
be satisfied.10 First, the distribution of material resources must be such as to ensure
participants’ independence and “voice.” Second, the institutionalized cultural
patterns of interpretation and evaluation express equal respect for all participants
and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem. Both these conditions are
necessary for participatory parity. Neither alone is sufficient. The first one brings into
focus concerns traditionally associated with the theory of distributive justice,
especially concerns pertaining to the economic structure of society and to
economically defined class differentials. The second one brings into focus concerns
recently highlighted in the philosophy of recognition, especially concerns pertaining
to the status order of society and to culturally defined hierarchies of status. Thus, a
bivalent conception of justice oriented to the norm of participatory parity
encompasses both redistribution and recognition, without reducing either one to the
other.
This brings us to the third question: Does justice require the recognition of what
is distinctive about individuals or groups, over and above the recognition of our
common humanity? This question cannot be answered, I contend, by an a priori
account of the kinds of recognition that everyone always needs. It needs rather to be
approached in the spirit of pragmatism as informed by the insights of a critical social
theory. From this perspective, recognition is a remedy for injustice, not a generic
human need. Thus, the form(s) of recognition justice requires in any given case
depend(s) on the form(s) of misrecognition to be redressed. Everything depends in
other words on precisely what currently misrecognized people need in order to be
able to participate as peers in social life. And there is no reason to assume that all of
them need the same thing in every context. In some cases, they may need to be
unburdened of excessive ascribed or constructed distinctiveness.  In other cases,
they may need to have hitherto underacknowledged distinctiveness taken into
6account. In still other cases, they may need to shift the focus onto dominant or
advantaged groups, outing the latter’s distinctiveness, which has been falsely
parading as universality. Alternatively, they may need to deconstruct the very terms
in which attributed differences are currently elaborated. Finally, they may need all of
the above, or several of the above, in combination with one another and in
combination with redistribution. Which people need which kind(s) of recognition in
which contexts depends on the nature of the obstacles they face with regard to
participatory parity. That, however, can only be determined with the aid of a critical
social theory.
This brings us to the social-theoretical issues that arise when we try to
encompass redistribution and recognition in a single framework. Here, the principal
task is to theorize the relations between class and status, and between
maldistribution and misrecognition, in contemporary society. An adequate approach
must allow for the full complexity of these relations. It must account both for the
differentiation of class from status and for the causal interactions between them. It
must accommodate, as well, both the mutual irreducibility of maldistribution and
misrecognition and their practical entwinement with one another.
To this end, I propose a thought experiment. Consider an ideal-typical pre-state
society of the sort described in the classical anthropological literature, while
bracketing the question of ethnographic accuracy.11 In such a society, the master
idiom of social relations is kinship. Kinship organizes not only marriage and sexual
relations, but also the labor process and the distribution of goods; relations of
authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige.
In such a society, class structure and status order are effectively fused. Because
kinship constitutes the overarching principle of distribution, kinship status dictates
class position. Status injuries translate immediately into (what we would consider to
be) distributive injustices. Misrecognition directly entails maldistribution.
Now consider the opposite extreme of a fully marketized society, in which
economic structure dictates cultural value. In such a society, the master determining
instance is the market. Markets organize not only the labor process and the
distribution of goods, but also marriage and sexual relations; political relations of
authority, reciprocity, and obligation; and symbolic hierarchies of status and prestige.
In this society, too, class structure and status order are effectively fused. But the
determinations run in the opposite direction. Because the market constitutes the sole
and all-pervasive mechanism of valuation, market position dictates social status. In
the absence of any quasi-autonomous cultural value patterns, distributive injustices
translate immediately into status injuries. Maldistribution directly entails
misrecognition.
In both of these societies, accordingly, (what we would call) class and status
map perfectly onto each other. So, as well, do (what we would call) maldistribution
and misrecognition, which convert fully and without remainder into one another. As a
7result, one can understand both these societies reasonably well by attending
exclusively to a single dimension of social life. For the fully kin-governed society,
one can read off the economic dimension of domination directly from the cultural;
one can infer class directly from status and maldistribution directly from
misrecognition. For the fully marketized society, conversely, one can read off the
cultural dimension of domination directly from the economic; one can infer status
directly from class and misrecognition directly from maldistribution. For
understanding the forms of domination proper to the fully kin-governed society,
therefore, culturalism is a perfectly appropriate social theory.12 If, in contrast, one is
seeking to understand the fully marketized society, one could hardly improve on
economism.13
When we turn to other types of societies, however, such simple and elegant
approaches no longer suffice. They are patently inappropriate for our society, which
contains specialized economic institutions and cultural institutions. The result is a
partial uncoupling of economic distribution from structures of prestige and a gap
between status and class. In our society, the class structure ceases perfectly to
mirror the status order, even though each of them influences the other. Because the
market does not constitute the sole and all-pervasive mechanism of valuation,
market position does not dictate social status. Partially market-resistant cultural
value patterns prevent distributive injustices from converting fully and without
remainder into status injuries. Maldistribution does not directly entail misrecognition,
although it certainly contributes to the latter. Conversely, because no single status
principle such as kinship constitutes the sole and all-pervasive principle of
distribution, status does not dictate class position. Relatively autonomous economic
institutions prevent status injuries from converting fully and without remainder into
distributive injustices. Misrecognition does not directly entail maldistribution,
although it, too, surely contributes to the latter. As a result, one cannot understand
this society by attending exclusively to a single dimension of social life. One cannot
read off the economic dimension of domination directly from the cultural, not the
cultural directly from the economic. Likewise, one cannot infer class directly from
status, nor status directly from class. Finally, one cannot deduce maldistribution
directly from misrecognition, nor misrecognition directly from maldistribution. It
follows that neither culturalism nor economism suffices for understanding capitalist
society. Instead, one needs an approach that can accommodate differentiation,
divergence, and interaction at every level.
What sort of social theory can handle this task? If neither economism nor
culturalism is up to the task, a dualism of some sort is required. But everything
depends on what sort. Two possibilities present themselves.14 The first I call
“substantive dualism.” It treats redistribution and recognition as two different
“spheres of justice,” pertaining to two different societal domains. The former pertains
to the economic domain of society, the latter to the cultural domain. When we
consider economic matters, such as the structure of labor markets, we should
assume the standpoint of distributive justice, attending to the impact of economic
structures and institutions on the relative economic position of social actors. When,
8in contrast, we consider cultural matters, such as the representation of female
sexuality on MTV, we should assume the standpoint of recognition, attending to the
impact of institutionalized patterns of interpretation and value on the status and
relative standing of social actors.
Substantive dualism may be preferable to economism and culturalism, but it is
nevertheless inadequate. Treating economy and culture as two separate spheres, it
mistakes the social differentiations for institutional divisions that are impermeable
and sharply bounded. In fact, the economy is not a culture-free zone, but a culture-
instrumentalizing and -resignifying one. Thus, what presents itself as “the economy”
is always already permeated with cultural interpretations and norms--witness the
distinctions between “working” and “caregiving,” “men’s jobs” and “women’s jobs,”
which are so fundamental to historical capitalism. In these cases, gender meanings
and norms have been appropriated from the larger culture and bent to capitalist
purposes, with major consequences for both distribution and recognition. Likewise,
what presents itself as “the cultural sphere” is deeply permeated by “the bottom
line”--witness global mass entertainment, the art market, and transnational
advertising, all fundamental to contemporary culture. Contra substantive dualism,
then, nominally economic matters usually affect not only the economic position but
also the status and identities of social actors. Likewise, nominally cultural matters
affect not only status but also economic position. In neither case, therefore, are we
dealing with separate spheres.15
Substantive dualism is not a solution to, but a symptom of, the uncoupling of
redistribution and recognition. A critical perspective, in contrast, must probe the
connections between them. It must make visible, and criticizable, both the cultural
subtexts of nominally economic processes and the economic subtexts of nominally
cultural practices. Treating every practice as simultaneously economic and cultural,
albeit not necessarily in equal proportions, it must assess each of them from two
different perspectives. It must assume both the standpoint of distribution and the
standpoint of recognition, without reducing either one of these perspectives to the
other.
Such an approach I call “perspectival dualism.” Here redistribution and
recognition do not correspond to two substantive societal domains, economy and
culture. Rather, they constitute two analytical perspectives that can be assumed with
respect to any domain. These perspectives can be deployed critically, moreover,
against the ideological grain. One can use the recognition perspective to identify the
cultural dimensions of what are usually viewed as redistributive economic policies.
By focusing on the production and circulation of interpretations and norms in welfare
programs, for example, one can assess the effects of institutionalized maldistribution
on the identities and social status of single mothers.16 Conversely, one can use the
redistribution perspective to bring into focus the economic dimensions of what are
usually viewed as issues of recognition. By focusing on the high “transaction costs”
of living in the closet, for example, one can assess the effects of heterosexist
9misrecognition on the economic position of gays and lesbians.17 With perspectival
dualism, then, one can assess the justice of any social practice from two analytically
distinct normative vantage points, asking: Does the practice in question work to
ensure both the economic conditions and the cultural conditions of participatory
parity? Or does it, rather, undermine them?
Beyond its theoretical strengths, perspectival dualism offers a major practical
advantage. It allows us to conceptualize some practical difficulties that can arise in
the course of political struggles for redistribution and recognition. It appreciates that
neither claims for redistribution nor claims for recognition can be contained within a
separate sphere. On the contrary, they impinge on one another in ways that may
give rise to unintended effects.
Consider, first, that redistribution impinges on recognition. Virtually any claim for
redistribution will have some recognition effects, whether intended or unintended.
Proposals to redistribute income through social welfare, for example, have an
irreducible expressive dimension;18 they convey interpretations of the meaning and
value of different activities, for example, “childrearing” versus “wage-earning,” while
also constituting and ranking different subject positions, for example “welfare
mothers” versus “tax payers.”19 Thus, redistributive claims invariably affect the status
and social identities of social actors. These effects must be thematized and
scrutinized, lest one end up fuelling misrecognition in the course of remedying
maldistribution.
The classic example, once again, is “welfare.” Means-tested benefits aimed
specifically at the poor are the most directly redistributive form of social welfare. Yet
such benefits tend to stigmatize recipients, casting them as deviants and scroungers
and invidiously distinguishing them from “wage-earners” and “tax-payers” who “pay
their own way.” Welfare programs of this type “target” the poor--not only for material
aid but also for public hostility. The end result is often to add the insult of
misrecognition to the injury of deprivation. Redistributive policies have
misrecognition effects when background patterns of cultural value skew the meaning
of economic reforms, when, for example, a pervasive cultural devaluation of female
caregiving inflects aid to single-parent families as “getting something for nothing.”20
In this context, welfare reform cannot succeed unless it is joined with struggles for
cultural change aimed at revaluing caregiving and the feminine associations that
code it.21 In short, no redistribution without recognition.
Consider, next, the converse dynamic, whereby recognition impinges on
distribution. Virtually any claim for recognition will have some distributive effects,
whether intended or unintended. Proposals to redress androcentric evaluative
patterns, for example, have economic implications, which work sometimes to the
detriment of the intended beneficiaries. For example, campaigns to suppress
prostitution and pornography for the sake of enhancing women’s status may have
negative effects on the economic position of sex workers, while no-fault divorce
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reforms, which appeared to dovetail with feminist efforts to enhance women’s status,
have had negative effects on the economic position of some divorced women.22
Thus, recognition claims can affect economic position, above and beyond their
effects on status. These effects, too, must be scrutinized, lest one end up fuelling
maldistribution in the course of trying to remedy misrecognition. Recognition claims,
moreover, are liable to the charge of being “merely symbolic.”23 When pursued in
contexts marked by gross disparities in economic position, reforms aimed at
recognizing distinctiveness tend to devolve into empty gestures; like the sort of
recognition that would put women on a pedestal, they mock, rather than redress,
serious harms. In such contexts, recognition reforms cannot succeed unless they are
joined with struggles for redistribution. In short, no recognition without redistribution.
The need, in all cases, is to think integratively, as in the example of comparable
worth. Here a claim to redistribute income between men and women is expressly
integrated with a claim to change gender-coded patterns of cultural value. The
underlying premise is that gender injustices of distribution and recognition are so
complexly intertwined that neither can be redressed entirely independently of the
other. Thus, efforts to reduce the gender wage gap cannot fully succeed if,
remaining wholly “economic,” they fail to challenge the gender meanings that code
low-paying service occupations as “women’s work,” largely devoid of intelligence
and skill. Likewise, efforts to revalue female-coded traits such as interpersonal
sensitivity and nurturance cannot succeed if, remaining wholly “cultural,” they fail to
challenge the structural economic conditions that connect those traits with
dependency and powerlessness. Only an approach that redresses the cultural
devaluation of the “feminine” precisely within the economy (and elsewhere) can
deliver serious redistribution and genuine recognition.
Let me conclude by suggesting that perspectival dualism in social theory
complements participatory parity in moral theory. Together, these two notions
constitute a portion of the conceptual resources one needs to begin answering what
I take to be the key political question of our day: How can one develop a coherent
programmatic perspective that integrates redistribution and recognition? How can
one develop a framework that integrates what remains cogent and unsurpassable in
the socialist vision with what is defensible and compelling in the apparently
“postsocialist” vision of multiculturalism?
If we fail to ask this question, if we cling instead to false antitheses and
misleading either/or dichotomies, we will miss the chance to envision social
arrangements that can redress both economic and cultural injustices. Only by
looking to integrative approaches that unite redistribution and recognition can we
meet the requirements of justice for all.
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